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From Deprivation to Distribution: 
 
Is Global Poverty Becoming A Matter of National Inequality? 
Andy Sumner 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper asks the following question: does the shift in global poverty towards 
middle-income countries (MICs) mean that global poverty is becoming a matter of 
national inequality? This paper argues that many of the world’s extreme poor already 
live in countries where the total cost of ending extreme poverty is not prohibitively 
high as a percentage of GDP. And in the not-too-distant future, most of the world’s 
poor will live in countries that do have the domestic financial scope to end at least 
extreme poverty and, in time, moderate poverty. This will likely pave the way for 
addressing poverty reduction as primarily a domestic issue rather than primarily an 
aid and international issue; and thus a (re)framing of poverty as a matter of national 
distribution and national social contracts and political settlements between elites, 
middle classes and the poor.  
 
Keywords: poverty; inequality; distribution; low-income countries; middle-income 
countries. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper asks the following question: Does the shift in global poverty towards 
middle-income countries (MICs) mean that global poverty is becoming a matter of 
national inequality? This paper argues that many of the world’s extreme poor already 
live in countries where the total cost of ending extreme poverty is not prohibitively 
high as a percentage of GDP. And in the not-too-distant future, most of the world’s 
poor will live in countries that do have the domestic financial scope to end at least 
extreme poverty.1  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 discusses concepts of absolute and 
relative ‘poor’ countries to assess if MICs are ‘poor’ countries and if so, in what 
sense. Section 2 focuses on the cost of ending poverty in middle-income countries 
and section 3 on trends in inequality, the number of ‘non-poor’ people, and presents 
a scenarios-based approach to the evolution of global poverty to 2020 and 2030. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1 Absolute and relative ‘poor’ 
countries 
 
The majority of the world’s poor, by income and multi-dimensional poverty measures, 
live in countries classified by the World Bank as middle-income countries (Alkire et 
al. 2011; Chandy and Gertz 2011; Glassman et al. 2011; Kanbur and Sumner 2011a, 
2011b; Koch 2011; Sumner 2010, 2012a; 2012b). Such patterns matter beyond the 
thresholds of low-income countries and middle-income countries (LICs/MICs) set by 
the World Bank, because they reflect a pattern of rising average incomes and 
although the thresholds do not mean a sudden change in countries when a line is 
crossed in per capita income, substantially higher levels of average per capita 
income imply substantially more domestic resources available for poverty reduction. 
 
If most of the world’s poor live in (lower) MICs, one question that follows is: to what 
extent are these ‘poor’ countries and/or ‘poor’ countries in relation to what? Dudley 
Seers (1963) provided the seminal discussion of developed country characteristics, 
and their divergence from the characteristics of developing countries. On this basis 
he could justify calling the developed, or industrialised, countries ‘a special case’ of ‘a 
few countries with highly unusual, not to say peculiar, characteristics’ (p80). This is in 
contrast to developing countries, for whom,  
 
[t]he typical case is a largely unindustrialised economy, the foreign trade of 
which consists essentially in selling primary products for manufactures. There 
are about 100 identifiable economies of this sort, covering the great majority of 
the world’s population (p80). 
 
                                                        
1  Special thanks to Pui Yan Wong and Henrique Conca Bussacos for research assistance. Thanks to Xavier 
Cirera, Jeni Klugman, Ben Leo, David Steven and Amy Pollard for feedback on earlier drafts. 
Correspondence to: a.sumner@ids.ac.uk 
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Table 1.1 Conceptualising ‘poor’ countries: indicators and indicative levels 
 
 Potential indicators Typology of Countries 
Absolute Poverty Relative Poverty Non-Poor 
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(th
re
sh
ol
d 
ba
se
d)
 
Average incomes 
compared to the 
international poverty 
lines ($1.25 and $2 per 
capita/day) 
Average income in GDP 
PPP pc less than 
international poverty 
lines (either $1.25 or $2 
per capita/day) 
Average income in GDP 
PPP pc higher than 
international poverty 
lines but less than 
$10/day (at which the 
risk of $4 poverty 
drastically declines*) or 
$13/day (the poverty line 
in USA**)  
Average income above 
$10 or $13/day per capita 
The overall ‘burden’ of 
poverty meaning the 
total poverty gap as a 
percentage of GDP 
(c.f. Kanbur and 
Mukherjee 2007) 
Cost of ending poverty 
greater than 2% of GDP 
(which is average military 
spending in LICs and 
MICs) 
Cost of ending poverty 
between 1–2% of GDP 
 
Cost of ending poverty 
less than 1% of GDP 
Structural indicators 
(c.f. Seers 1963) 
 
(e.g. aid dependency, 
forex reserves, GDP in 
agriculture or export 
dependency on primary 
sectors) 
 
 
Most or all of the 
following characteristics: 
 
Aid dependency above 
10% of GNI; forex 
reserves of less than 3 
months; more than 50% 
of GDP in agriculture; 
more than 50% of 
exports in primary sector 
Most or all of the 
following characteristics: 
 
Aid dependency of 1–
10% GNI; forex reserves 
of 3–6 months; 25–50% 
GDP in agriculture; 25–
50% of exports in 
primary sector 
Most or all of the 
following characteristics: 
 
Aid dependency below 
1% of GNI; forex 
reserves of 6 months 
plus; less than 25% of 
GDP in agriculture; less 
than 25% of exports in 
primary sector 
R
el
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 o
th
er
 c
ou
nt
rie
s)
 
Per capita income 
relative to per capita 
income in LICs (or 
LDCs, FCAS or Q1 
GDP pc PPP) 
Per capita income less 
than average per capita 
income in current group 
of LICs (or other groups) 
Per capita income less 
than average per capita 
income in current group 
of MICs 
Per capita income 
comparable to OECD 
high-income countries 
Levels of extreme 
poverty (% of 
population) compared 
to LICs (or LDCs, 
FCAS or Q1 GDP pc 
PPP) 
Levels of extreme 
poverty (% of population) 
more than average for 
current group of LICs (or 
other groups) 
Levels of extreme 
poverty (% of population) 
more than average for 
current group of MICs 
Levels of extreme 
poverty (% of population) 
comparable to OECD 
high-income countries 
Structural indicators 
(c.f. Seers 1963)  
(e.g. aid dependency, 
forex reserves, GDP in 
agriculture or export 
dependency on primary 
sectors), relative to 
LICs (or LDCs, FCAS 
or Q1 GDP pc PPP) 
Structural indicators 
comparable to current 
group of LICs (or other 
groups) 
Structural indicators 
comparable to current 
group of MICs 
Structural indicators 
comparable to OECD 
high-income countries  
Source: Author and those listed. Notes: * = source is López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011).  ** = source is Ravallion 
(2010). FCAS = 45 Fragile and Conflict Affected States of OECD (2011b); LDC = Least Developed Countries Group; 
Q1 GDP pc PPP = poorest quartile of countries by GDP pc PPP. 
 
Seers (1963: 81–83) identified the characteristic features of the ‘special case’ or 
advanced economies in ‘note form’ including, for example, factors of production (e.g. 
literacy and the mobility of labour), sectors of the economy (e.g. manufacturing much 
larger than either agriculture or mining), public finance (e.g. reliance on direct taxes), 
households (e.g. very few below subsistence level and a moderately equal 
distribution of income), savings and investment (e.g. well-developed financial 
intermediaries), and ‘dynamic influences’ (e.g. slow population growth and high 
urbanisation). 
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One could conceptualise ‘poor’ countries in various ways. Table 1.1 sketches a set of 
absolute measures (meaning thresholds based) and relative measures (meaning 
measures relative to other countries) of absolute poverty and relative poverty at 
country level (and potential indicative levels for further investigation). 
 
In absolute terms (meaning thresholds) one might conceptualise ‘poor’ countries in 
terms of absolute poverty, relative poverty or non-poor by:  
 
(i) by average incomes compared to the international poverty lines ($1.25 and 
$2 per capita/day), or  
(ii) by the overall ‘burden’ of poverty meaning the total poverty gap as a 
percentage of GDP, or 
(iii) by structural indicators. 
 
One could also think of ‘poor’ countries in relative terms (relative to other countries). 
For example,  
 
(i) by per capita income relative to per capita income in LICs (or LDCs or 
another grouping), or  
(ii) by overall levels of extreme poverty (per cent of population) compared to 
LICs; or  
(iii) by various structural indicators (e.g. aid dependency, forex reserves, GDP in 
agriculture or export dependency on primary sectors), relative to LICs; or 
(iv) by such structural indicators relative to high-income countries (HICs) of the 
OECD.  
 
Analysis of the correlations in LICs and LMICs between GDP PPP per capita and 
structural indicators (see tables in appendix 2) lends support to the case for further 
consideration of such indicators.  
 
Correlations are evident to varying degrees for various measures suggested by 
Seers. For example, GDP pc PPP and (a) net ODA/gross capital formation; (b) Net 
ODA/GNI; (c) agricultural exports as a percent of exports; (d) agriculture value 
added/GDP; (e) urbanization and (f) gross domestic savings/GDP. 
 
LICs and LMICs can also be compared with three other country groupings related to 
“poor” countries: the group of 45 fragile and conflict affected states (as listed in 
OECD, 2011b); the UN group of 48 Least Developed Countries and also the group of 
45 countries that are in the poorest quartile of all countries by GDP PPP per capita 
(see Appendix 1, Table A3 for population coverage by indicator and group). 
 
In absolute terms, the group averages for LMICs suggest average per capita PPP 
income at almost five times the higher international poverty line of $2. In relative 
terms, the average for the LMIC group is considerably higher than the average 
income of the LIC group – which itself is barely above the higher international poverty 
line. Average per capita income in the LMIC group is typically three times the level of 
LICs and, notably, GDP per capita by PPP is approaching $10 per person/day (see 
Table 1.2 below).  
 
Overall, levels of extreme poverty as a percentage of population are lower in the 
LMIC group average compared to the LIC average (see Table 1.2 below), though still 
surprisingly high in LMICs despite higher average per capita incomes as noted (see 
also discussion in Sumner 2012b). For comparison, data for Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States (FCAS), for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and for the poorest 
quartile of all countries by GDP per capita PPP (Q1) see Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.  
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This discussion is – evidently – overly focused on economic development. One could 
pursue further dimensions of development such as governance and sustainability 
amongst others (see for discussion Gentilini and Sumner, 2012). 
 
Table 1.2 Estimates of average income per capita, 2009 (population weighted) 
 
 World Bank classifications Other classifications 
 
LICs (35) 
 
 
LMICs 
(56) 
 
 
LMICs 
minus 
India 
 
FCAS 
(45) 
LDC 
(48) 
Q1 GDP 
pc PPP 
(45) 
GNI per capita/day (Atlas, current $) 1.3 3.9 4.6  2.7   5.8   2.7  
GNI pc/day (PPP, current $) 3.1 9.1 9.3  5.1   3.8   4.0  
GDP pc/day (PPP, 2005 constant $) 2.9 8.5 8.8  4.7   3.5   3.6  
Poverty (% pop., $1.25, 2008)  48.5 30.2 23.4  39.9   46.1   48.1  
Source: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b) and PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). Note:  Some indicators 
have weaker coverage for FCAS, LDCs and Q1 countries - see annex for data coverage.  FCAS = 45 Fragile and 
Conflict Affected States of OECD (2011b); LDC = Least Developed Countries Group; Q1 GDP pc PPP = poorest 
quartile of countries by GDP per capita PPP. 
 
Table 1.3 Structural indicators, 2009 (population weighted) 
 
 World Bank classifications Other classifications 
 
LICs (35) 
 
 
LMICs 
(56) 
 
 
LMICs 
minus 
India 
 
FCAS 
(45) 
LDC 
(48) 
Q1 GDP 
pc PPP 
(45) 
Net ODA as % of GNI * 12.6 1.0 1.8 7.1 11.1 9.6 
Net ODA/Gross capital formation * 53.1 3.5 6.3 32.8 41.2 36.2 
Total reserves in months of imports 4.5 8.0 6.3 3.8 3.4 4.1 
GDP in agriculture (%) 30.8 17.3 16.8 20.2 26.6 23.0 
Urbanisation (% population) 27.9 39.2 47.6 34.9 28.8 32.4 
Gross domestic savings as % GDP 9.1 24.4 17.3 8.0 10.0 8.1 
Agricultural raw materials as % 
exports * 9.7 1.9 2.6 3.8 4.4 4.6 
Ores and metal as % exports * 7.4 5.9 5.5 2.0 5.4 4.3 
Sources: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: * = A high degree of dispersion within country 
groupings suggests some caution is required in interpretation of these indicators.  Some indicators have weaker 
coverage for FCAS, LDCs and Q1 countries - see annex for data coverage.  FCAS = 45 Fragile and Conflict Affected 
States of OECD (2011b); LDC = Least Developed Countries Group; Q1 GDP pc PPP = poorest quartile of countries 
by GDP per capita PPP. 
 
If one considers the kind of structural indicators Seers identified in the Limitations of 
the Special Case, one again finds that LMICs are unequivocally better off than LICs 
(see Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Indeed, one might argue that LMICs are not ‘poor’ 
countries by the LMIC group averages, with an aid/GNI of 1 per cent GDP, and an 
aid/gross capital formation of just 3.5 per cent; compared to LICs with an aid/GNI of 
12.6 per cent, and an aid/gross capital formation of 53.1 per cent. However, some 
caution is again required, as the degree of dispersion is significant in the country 
groups.  
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Indicators of GDP in agriculture, savings, export dependency on agriculture and 
urbanisation suggests that the LMIC group is, in general, qualitatively different to the 
LIC group. For example, GDP in agriculture is drastically lower in the LMIC group 
compared to the LIC group, and urbanisation much higher (almost 50 per cent when 
India is removed).  
 
Overall, it is evident that LMICs have higher standards of living than LICs, and are far 
less aid dependent. The average, population weighted GNI per capita – by Atlas or 
PPP – in LMICs is three times that of LICs. However, it is worth remembering that 
the LMIC group average for GDP per capita PPP is still only 10 per cent of the per 
capita PPP income of OECD HICs, and in LICs just 3 per cent (see Table 1.4).  
 
Table 1.4 Economic indicators as % OECD HICs, 2009 (population weighted) 
 
 World Bank classifications Other classifications HICs 
 LICs 
(35) 
 
 
 
LMICs 
(56) 
 
 
 
LMICs 
minus 
India 
 
FCAS 
(45) 
LDC 
(48) 
Q1 GDP 
pc PPP 
(45) 
GNI per capita/day (Atlas, 
current $) 1.2  3.7   4.3   2.6   5.5   2.5  
100.0 
GNI pc/day (PPP, current $) 3.1  9.1   9.2   5.2   3.9   4.0  100.0 
GDP pc/day (PPP, const. $) 3.2 9.5 9.8  5.3   4.0   4.1  100.0 
Total reserves in months of 
imports 104.7 186.0 146.5  78.1   69.0   83.5  
100.0 
GDP in agriculture (%) 
 
2,008.9 1,127.9 1,095.5  1,361.6   1,796.7   1,549.2  
100.0 
Urbanisation (% population) 36.2 50.9 61.8  45.2   37.3   42.0  100.0 
Gross domestic savings as % 
GDP 50.8 136.3 96.6  43.1   53.7   43.6  
100.0 
Agricultural raw materials as % 
exports * 646.7 126.7 173.3  261.0   295.6   309.6  
100.0 
Ores and metal as % exports * 205.6 163.9 152.8  132.6   366.8   288.8  100.0 
Sources: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: * = A high degree of dispersion within country 
groupings suggests some caution is required in interpretation of these indicators.  Some indicators have weaker 
coverage for FCAS, LDCs and Q1 countries - see annex for data coverage.  FCAS = 45 Fragile and Conflict Affected 
States of OECD (2011b); LDC = Least Developed Countries Group; Q1 GDP pc PPP = poorest quartile of countries 
by GDP per capita PPP. 
 
 
2 The relative cost of ending poverty 
 
Even if most of the world’s poor live in countries that are not the poorest countries, 
nor absolutely ‘poor’ countries, nor aid-dependent, the cost of ending poverty may be 
of a size relative to GDP that means it is unlikely poverty can be fully addressed via 
domestic resources. In short, one could consider whether countries are ‘poor’ relative 
to the capacity to end poverty (see discussion in Kanbur and Mukherjee 2007), 
expressed as the cost of ending poverty as percentage of GDP. This then estimates 
the ‘transfer’ necessary as a percentage of GDP from the non-poor to the poor to end 
poverty.  
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Using such an approach, absolute and relative poor countries might be estimated by 
a threshold – with absolute poor countries needing perhaps more than 2 per cent of 
GDP to close the poverty gap, and relative poor countries requiring 1–2 per cent on 
the basis that the average for military spending is, respectively, 1.6 per cent and 2.2 
per cent in the LIC and LMIC groupings (estimated from data in WDI, World 
Bank,2011b), where most of the world’s poor live and military spending is a crude 
proxy for alternative uses of resources. 
 
Tables 2.1 to 2.4 present data on the total poverty gap as a percentage of GDP. Data 
is presented in PPP constant 2005 international dollars to be comparable with later 
estimates on the poverty gap in 2020 and 2030. 
 
Table 2.1 Estimates of the total poverty gap as % GDP, PPP$ constant 2005 
international $) by $1.25 and $2 poverty line in 2008/9 
 
 
Total poverty gap as  
% GDP PPP 
Distribution of world poverty (%) 
 $1.25 $2 $1.25 $2 
LICs 8.4 25.4 25.7 20.6 
LMICs 1.3 5.5 57.7 59.2 
UMICs 0.2 0.6 16.7 20.2 
 - -   
East Asia and Pacific 0.3 1.5 21.5 26.1 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 
Latin American and the Caribbean 
0.2 0.4 
 
2.9 
2.9 
Middle East and North Africa 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.9 
South Asia 1.5 7.5 44.3 45.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 13.0 30.5 23.2 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) and WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Data presented as 
PPP$, constant 2005 international $ rather than current US$ for comparison with 2020 and 2030 estimates (see 
below). Poverty gap as % GDP = PG%/100% x $1.25 per day x 365 x Population. 
 
In the LMICs, the group average for the cost of ending poverty is 1.3 per cent of GDP 
PPP for $1.25 poverty, but 5.5 per cent for $2 poverty (compared to 8.4 per cent and 
25.4 per cent respectively for LICs).  
 
Seventeen MICs have a total poverty gap of greater than 1 per cent of GDP (PPP$, 
constant 2005 international $), ranging up to 12.8 per cent in Zambia (See Table 
2.2). When the data for the 20 countries with 90 per cent of world poverty are 
considered, many of the countries which have particularly high costs of ending $1.25 
(and $2) poverty as a proportion of GDP are LICs, such as Bangladesh, the DRC, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Malawi. That said, MICs like Nigeria, 
Angola and Nepal in that list of twenty countries also have high costs of ending 
poverty (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.2 Estimates for MICs with total poverty gap greater than 1% GDP, 
2008/9, descending order, $1.25 poverty line (PPP$, constant 2005 international 
$) 
 
Country % GDP 
1. Zambia 12.8 
2. Nigeria 7.6 
3. Lesotho 5.7 
4. Timor-Leste 4.9 
5. Papua New Guinea 3.6 
6. Congo, Rep. 2.8 
7. Ghana 2.7 
8. Angola 2.6 
9. Cote d'Ivoire 2.2 
10. Lao PDR 2.1 
11. Senegal 2.0 
12. Swaziland 1.9 
13. India 1.5 
14. Honduras 1.5 
15. Mauritania 1.4 
16. Sao Tome and Principe 1.3 
17. Sudan * 1.3 
Source: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b) and PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). Note: Data presented as 
PPP$, constant 2005 international $ rather than current US$ for comparability with 2020 and 2030 estimates (see 
below). Poverty gap as % GDP = PG%/100% x $1.25 per day x 365 x Population. Note: * = The poverty data listed in 
PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) for Sudan in 2008 appears lower than one might expect suggesting caution (see also 
discussion in Sumner 2012b). 
 
One can go further and estimate ‘bands’ of the cost of ending $1.25 poverty and $2 
poverty (see Table 2.4). This splits the world’s $1.25 poor between countries that 
have a cost of ending poverty of more than 2 per cent of GDP, and countries that 
have a cost of ending $1.25 poverty of less than 2 per cent. However, when $2 
poverty is considered, 80 per cent of the world’s poor live in countries where the cost 
of ending $2 poverty would be more than 3 per cent of GDP. 
 
If most of the world’s poor lived in countries with the domestic financial capacity to 
end at least extreme poverty, extreme poverty would be a matter of national 
distribution and domestic political economy (for example, via the redistributive 
preferences of the middle classes and elites). This would imply the need for a 
fundamental reframing of global poverty as largely a matter of domestic distribution.  
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Table 2.3 Top 20 poor countries (by number of $1.25 poor people) with 
estimated cost of ending poverty as % GDP, 2008/9 (PPP$, constant 2005 
international $) 
 
 
Cost of ending $1.25 
poverty (% GDP) PPP, 
constant 2005 int’l $ 
Cost of ending $2 poverty 
(% GDP) PPP, constant 
2005 int’l $ 
 2008/9 2008/9 
India 1.5 7.1 
China 0.3 1.3 
Nigeria 7.6 18.4 
Bangladesh 4.6 19.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79.4 165.5 
Indonesia 0.6 3.5 
Pakistan* 0.7 5.6 
Tanzania 10.7 29.2 
Philippines 0.6 3.1 
Kenya 4.9 15.2 
Vietnam 0.7 3.8 
Uganda 6.5 21.6 
Madagascar 15.5 38.7 
Mozambique 14.8 40.4 
Ethiopia* 1.6 13.8 
Brazil 0.2 0.4 
Angola 2.6 5.8 
Malawi 18.1 49.7 
Nepal 4.0 17.5 
Sudan* 1.3 5.9 
Source: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b) and PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). Note: * = The poverty 
data listed in PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) for these countries in 2008 appears lower than one might expect 
suggesting caution (see also discussion in Sumner, 2012b) and for rates by national poverty lines see Gentilini and 
Sumner (2012). 
 
Table 2.4 Estimates of the distribution of world poverty by total cost of ending 
poverty, US$1.25 and US$2, 1990 and 2008/9 as a percentage of GDP (PPP$, 
constant 2005 international $) 
 
 US$1.25 US$2 
World poverty by  1990 2008/9 1990 2008/9 
Countries where the total monetary value of ending poverty is 
less than 1% of country’s GDP 4.0 22.5 1.2 3.7 
Countries where the total monetary value of ending poverty is 
between 1.01% and 2.00% of country’s GDP 1.1 29.0 3.3 14.9 
Countries where the total monetary value of ending poverty is 
between 2.01% and 3.00% of country’s GDP 0.6 3.0 0.1 0.4 
Countries where the total monetary value of ending poverty is 
more than 3.01% of country’s GDP 94.4 45.0 95.3 81.0 
Total world poverty 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012) and WDI (World Bank, 2011b). 
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3 National inequality, the ‘emerging 
middle’ and the (possible) evolving 
distribution of global poverty 
 
A pertinent question to ask in light of the changes in global poverty towards middle-
income countries is what is happening to inequality as average incomes rise? What 
has happened to inequality in the countries where global poverty is concentrated? 
How does inequality differ across countries at different levels of per capita income? 
The Kuznets Curve is well known in Economics. Simon Kuznets (1955; 1963) argued, 
in his presidential address to the 1954 American Economic Association and in later 
articles, a relationship based on a ‘hypothetical numerical exercise’ of which Kuznets 
noted 5% was empirical information and 95% was speculation. Kuznets postulated an 
inverted U shape relationship between income and inequality. Kuznets predicted an 
increase in inequality in the early stages of development and a reduction in inequality in 
subsequent periods. This was formulated using the Lewis dual economy model.2 
Kuznets argued that agricultural economies (i.e. developing countries) are initially 
relatively equal societies with low average income. As the economy develops, the 
population migrates to non-agricultural sectors, where average incomes are higher, as 
is inequality. Thus initially, inequality worsens because of the higher proportion of 
national income in the industrial sector and the higher proportion of profits in national 
income. The early benefits of economic growth go to those with control over capital and 
better education. In time, as more of the population move out of the traditional, rural, 
agricultural sector to the modern, urban, industrial sector and real wages in industry 
begin to rise, income inequality decreases. What Kuznets implied on the inequality-to-
growth linkage was that there is a trade off: inequality is a short-term price worth paying 
for long-term economic development and that growth would eventually lead 
mechanistically to poverty reduction through the ‘trickle down’ effect.  
 
There has been a wide range of research pursuing these questions (see review in 
Sumner and Tiwari, 2009). The sum of which is as follows: Economic growth can 
impact on inequality through various channels including modification to the distribution 
of resources across sectors, relative prices, factor rewards and factor endowments. 
However, there are too many country specifics to make a generalization and the quality 
and availability of inequality data constrain the ability to make definitive statements.3 
 
If one focuses on the share of GNI to the poorest (the poorest 20% or poorest 40%), 
the country group averages in LICs, LMICs and UMICs are thought provoking:  
 
The pattern that emerges when one considers the data without India and without 
China is that the share of GNI to the poorest 20 percent or poorest 40 percent of the 
population declines as countries get better off and carries on declining.  
 
The share of GNI to the poorest 20 percent or 40 percent of population is highest in 
LICs and lowest in UMICs if one considers the data without India in the LMICs and 
without China in the UMICs group (see table 3.1).  
 
                                                        
2  Lewis, however, did not assume a rise in inequality to be inevitable. 
3  Deininger and Squire note (1998:279) the failure to find the Kuznets curve relationship overall does not mean it 
does not exist for individual countries: In 4 countries of their 49 country sample the Kuznets hypothesis was 
supported. 
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At the same time the share of GNI of the richest decile rises as one moves from the 
LICs to LMICs without India. The share of the rich then drastically rises as one 
moves from considering LMICs without India to the UMICs without China (see also 
later discussion).  
 
This and the ‘capture’ of about half of GNI in the middle deciles (decile 5-decile 9) in 
LICs, LMICs and UMICs corroborates Palma’s (2011) ‘homogeneous middles, 
heterogeneous tails’ thesis (see below) that the middle classes always capture half of 
GNI and politics is about the contest between the rich and the poor for the rest. 
 
Table 3.1 Estimates of inequality, 2008, nearest available data (population 
weighted) 
 
 LICs LMICs 
minus India 
UMICs 
minus 
China 
All 
LMICs 
All 
UMICs 
GNI to poorest 20% (%) 7.9 7.3 4.9 8.0 4.9 
Poorest 4 deciles (D1–D4) 19.5 18.4 13.9 19.6 14.5 
Middle 5 deciles (D9–D5) 51.1 51.2 49.8 51.1 51.8 
Richest decile (D10) 29.4 30.4 36.3 29.3 33.7 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). 
 
In the top 20 countries where 90 per cent of the world’s poor live (see Sumner 
2012b), only 15 of those 20 countries have two data points (see table 3.2). In those 
countries, the share of GNI to the poorest four deciles is, in general, static or 
declining when 1990 and 2008 are compared (using nearest available survey data).  
 
However, five of the 15 countries are experiencing an increased share of GNI to the 
poorest 40 per cent by more than 2 percentage points (Pakistan, Kenya, Uganda, 
Ethiopia, Brazil and Nepal). In parallel, the share of the richest decile is static or 
rising in most countries, with more or less the same set of exceptions – Pakistan, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Brazil and Nepal. 
 
Palma (2011) noted that the share of GNI to those who are neither extremely poor 
(which he defines as the poorest four expenditure deciles), nor rich (defined as the 
richest expenditure decile), is surprisingly similar, at about 50 per cent of GNI, 
regardless of where (and when) one looks at the distribution data (see table 3.3).  
 
In short, there is a remarkable capture of half of GNI by those deciles between the 
poor and the rich. This suggests that, as Palma (2011) argues, domestic politics is 
about a contest for the remaining 50 per cent of GNI between the very rich and the 
very poor.  
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Table 3.2 Top 20 poor countries (by total number of $1.25 poor people) and 
inequality data, 1990 vs. 2008 (nearest available data) 
 
 Richest decile (D10) Middle 5 deciles (D5–D9) Poorest 4 deciles (D1–D4) 
 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 
India 27.0 28.3 51.6 50.9 21.4 20.9 
China 25.3 32.0 54.5 53.2 20.2 14.8 
Nigeria 31.5 38.2 55.7 49.1 12.8 12.7 
Bangladesh 23.2 27.0 53.5 51.7 23.3 21.3 
DRC n/a 34.7 n/a 50.6 n/a 14.7 
Indonesia 24.7 28.5 52.7 51.1 22.6 20.4 
Pakistan 27.1 26.1 52.6 51.4 20.3 22.5 
Tanzania 26.6 29.6 53.8 52.5 19.6 17.9 
Philippines 34.7 33.6 50.1 51.0 15.2 15.4 
Kenya 47.9 38.0 42.0 48.5 10.1 13.5 
Vietnam 29.0 28.2 51.8 52.9 19.2 18.9 
Uganda 33.7 36.1 52.1 48.4 14.2 15.5 
Madagascar 36.9 34.7 48.7 50.4 14.4 14.9 
Mozambique n/a 36.7 n/a 48.6 n/a 14.7 
Ethiopia 33.8 25.6 48.1 51.9 18.0 22.5 
Brazil 48.4 42.9 44.2 47.1 7.5 10.0 
Angola n/a 44.7 n/a 47.6 n/a 7.7 
Malawi n/a 31.9 n/a 50.4 n/a 17.8 
Nepal 29.1 26.5 51.3 53.1 19.6 20.4 
Sudan n/a 26.7 n/a 54.8 n/a 18.5 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). Note: All data are derived from consumption surveys, 
with exception of China and Brazil which are derived from income surveys (see Appendix 1, table A1). 
 
Palma (2011) argued that, in light of the observation that the share of GNI of those 
people in deciles D5–D9 is generally half of national income, the ‘middle classes’ 
should be renamed the ‘median classes’: 
 
Basically, it seems that a schoolteacher, a junior or mid-level civil servant, a 
young professional (other than economics graduates working in financial 
markets), a skilled worker, middle-manager or a taxi driver who owns his or her 
own car, all tend to earn the same income across the world — as long as their 
incomes are normalized by the income per capita of the respective country. 
(Palma 2011: 102) 
 
It is worth remembering, as noted above, that the amount of redistribution required to 
end extreme ($1.25/day) poverty can be quite low in some middle-income countries. 
Ravallion (2010) has argued that most countries with an average per capita PPP 
income of over $4,000 would require very small additional taxation to end poverty.4 
Ravallion (2010) estimated the necessary marginal tax rates (MTRs) on the ‘rich’ 
(those earning more than $13/day) in order to end poverty in each country. He 
argues that MTRs over 60 per cent would be prohibitive. Ravallion’s data suggests 
                                                        
4  Palma (2011) notes that Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, which distributes US$50/month to 11 million families, costs 
about 0.5 per cent of GDP (in 2005); and Soares et al. (2011) find that conditional cash transfers in Brazil, 
Mexico and Chile have cost less than 1 per cent of GDP. 
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that the MTRs necessary to end poverty are high in many of the ‘new MICs’ (in 
contrast, many ‘old’ MICs would require MTRs of under 10 per cent to end poverty). 
This is particularly due to large populations of poor relative to the number of ‘rich’ 
people in many new MICs.  
 
Table 3.3 Estimates of share of GNI, expenditures and population, D5–D9, 1990 
and 2008 (nearest available data, population weighted) 
 
 GNI  
Average share (%) 
D10 (richest 10%) 1990 2008 
All developing countries 27.6 31.0 
LMICs (current group) 24.8 29.3 
LMICs (current group) minus India 28.2 30.4 
UMICs (current group) 28.2 33.7 
UMICs (current group) minus China 35.0 36.3 
New MICs 30.6 31.0 
D5–D9 (middle 50%)   
All developing countries 51.9 50.8 
LMICs (current group) 52.2 51.1 
LMICs (current group) minus India 52.8 51.2 
UMICs (current group) 53.3 51.8 
UMICs (current group) minus China 50.5 49.8 
New MICs 50.9 50.4 
D1–D4 (poorest 40%)     
All developing countries 19.1 17.1 
LMICs (current group) 20.3 19.6 
LMICs (current group) minus India 19.0 18.4 
UMICs (current group) 18.5 14.5 
UMICs (current group) minus China 14.5 13.9 
New MICs 18.5 18.6 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). 
 
If the scope for domestic taxes is insufficient, access to aid may still be important in 
middle-income countries, for the near future at least. Further, Cardenas et al. (2011: 
19) are sceptical of tax rises for the middle classes based on the attitudes expressed 
in the World Values Survey for Peru: 
 
the status quo in many Latin American countries is a very low level of income 
taxation for the middle classes. Given their attitudes and political say, it is 
very unlikely that the expansion of the middle class will result in greater levels 
of personal income taxation. This is the main difference in tax structures 
compared to the developed world. 
 
OECD (2011a) discusses in some considerable detail middle class preferences for 
the amount of income redistribution via fiscal policy notably what middle class 
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households gain and the quality of public services.5 Other factors that determine 
preferences to redistribution are noted from the literature, including: personal 
experiences of social mobility (Piketty 1995), national and regional cultural and social 
values (Alesina and Giuliano 2009), the extent of impacts of (higher) taxation on 
leisure consumption (Meltzer and Richards 1981), levels of university education 
(Daude and Melguizo 2010; Torgler 2005), and attitudes to prevailing levels of 
meritocracy (Alesina and Angeletos 2005). It is also noted that support for 
redistribution is undermined by low institutional capacity in tax administration, the 
quality of state services, and pessimistic views over social mobility (Gaviria 2007; 
Torgler 2005). 
 
In short, the capacity to redistribute and the preferences of the non-poor for 
redistributive policies may become increasingly important for poverty reduction in 
middle-income countries. However, if there is little support amongst the more secure 
middle classes for paying more taxes, such policies will be constrained by political 
economy factors. This will be made worse if the lower ‘middle millions’ are only just 
above extreme poverty.  
 
The number of ‘non-poor’ people in the world (here meaning those above $2/day) 
has risen significantly since 1990, as a proportion of the population and in absolute 
numbers (see Table 3.4 and Appendix 3). There has been a particularly notable 
expansion between $2–$4/day and $4–$10/day. Across all developing countries the 
proportion of people in the $2–$10 group has risen from about a quarter to almost a 
half. When the data is analysed without China the rise is less pronounced but still 
significant. The rises are particularly noticeable in the new MIC group, but visible in 
the data across both LMIC and UMIC groups. 
 
Table 3.4 Estimates of population (% population) by region and expenditure 
groups, 1990 and 2008 
 
 Less than $2 $2–$4 $4–$10 
 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 
LMICs (current group) 73.3 59.1 18.3 27.2 6.7 11.0 
UMICs (current group) 58.4 20.3 18.5 26.4 16.0 35.6 
China 84.6 29.8 13.4 32.2 1.9 31.0 
India 82.6 72.4 14.5 22.2 2.6 4.8 
New MICs 78.5 64.9 15.3 25.0 4.8 8.1 
LICs (current group) 82.8 74.4 14.1 19.8 2.9 5.1 
All developing countries 67.1 43.9 17.2 25.9 10.9 21.1 
All developing countries minus China 60.2 48.6 18.7 23.9 14.4 17.9 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). Note: Data is population weighted. 
 
The actual numbers of people (see data in appendix 3) in the $2–$4 range have 
risen from 700m to 1.4bn, and in the $4–$10 range from 400m to 1.1bn, across 
                                                        
5  In particular OECD (2011a) addresses what role the middle classes in Latin America play in shaping fiscal 
policy and redistribution, and the impact of fiscal policies on the middle classes. It notes (pp23, 147) that: 
‘what middle-sector [middle class] people pay in taxes is close to what they receive in the form of social 
spending. The middle (decile) in Chile pays on average taxes equivalent to 18.3 per cent of its disposable 
income, while receiving benefits of 20.6 per cent. Similarly, in Mexico taxes amount to 13.2 per cent of 
disposable income and benefits are equal to 23.8 per cent. In sum, the net effect of fiscal policy for middle-
sector families, while marginally positive, is not large, and they benefit most from in-kind services such as 
education and health care… [However], if these services are of low quality, the middle sector is more likely to 
consider itself a loser in the fiscal bargain and less willing to contribute to financing of the public sector.’ 
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developing countries between 1990 and 2008. The rises are less pronounced without 
China but still entail a near doubling in the number of people in both the $2–$4/day 
and $4–$10/day group; so that there are now around 2 billion people under $2/day 
globally excluding China, 1bn in the $2–$4 range, and 720m in the $4–$10 range. 
The rise in numbers of people is, as noted above, particularly noticeable in the new 
MIC group but also crosses both LMIC and UMIC groups. 
 
As countries get richer in per capita income, on average individual taxes as a 
proportion of GDP rise (see Table 3.5). As people’s expenditures rise above $2/day 
their consumption patterns change, resulting in an increasing exposure to indirect 
and sales taxes, and perhaps formal (and informal) payments for business licenses 
(although possibly not income taxes if they are in the informal sector).6 This has the 
potential to change perceptions of the relationship between the state and the 
individual.  
 
Recent empirical evidence for this is provided by Devarajan et al. (2011: 15), who 
identify that there is a positive relationship, significant at 1 per cent, between the 
level of tax revenue and the extent of voice and accountability in a country (using 
Kaufmann governance indicators for voice and accountability); but that there is a 
threshold at 49 per cent of GDP after which, with excessively high levels of taxation, 
the relationship is inverted. As the authors note (p15), ‘Since the tax-to-GDP ratio in 
most developing countries is below this level, one can assume that most of them are 
situated on the rising part of the relationship where increases in the level of taxation 
are associated with more accountability.’ Interestingly, Devarajan et al. (2011: 13) 
also note that governance and education have a strong association even after 
controlling for various variables. 
 
Table 3.5 shows that, as average income rises, total tax as a proportion of GDP 
rises; as does individual income tax, corporate tax and tax on goods and services. 
And at the same time as average income rises, aid is becoming less and less 
significant as a proportion of GNI in new MICs. There is thus a shift from external 
funding in the form of aid towards non-aid and domestic sources from taxation; 
hypothetically, this implies a shift in accountability from state-to-donors to state-to-
domestic tax payers (and/or natural resource incomes) (see Brautigam et al. 2008; 
Moore 2007). 
 
Table 3.5 Tax indicators in LICs, LMICs, UMICs, HICs, 2009 or most recent year 
 LICs  
(N = 37) 
LMIC 
(N = 48) 
UMIC  
(N = 41) 
HIC OECD 
(N = 30) 
Total government taxes as % GDP     
Mean 13.0 17.7 20.7 35.4 
Standard deviation 5.5 7.9 8.2 7.3 
Individual income tax as % GDP     
Mean 1.6 1.9 2.3 9.7 
Standard deviation 1.4 1.4 1.8 4.9 
Corporate income tax as % GDP     
Mean 2.2 2.9 3.4 3.1 
Standard deviation 2.2 2.5 2.8 1.8 
Taxes on goods and services as % GDP     
Mean 5.0 6.1 7.1 11.2 
Standard deviation 3.0 3.1 4.0 3.1 
Source: Processed from IMF (2011: 53, 54). 
                                                        
6  IMF (2011: 25) estimates average VAT rates at end 2010 as 16 per cent  in LICs, 13 per cent in LMICs and 
15 per cent in UMICs. 
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One position to take is that there is little need to worry about the poor in MICs 
because growth will end poverty in the near future. How reasonable is this 
argument? Conceptually, the poor in middle-income countries could be disconnected 
from a country’s growth due to spatial inequality or remoteness. The poor may also 
be relatively voiceless in domestic governance structures and potentially 
discriminated against in public services and public spending allocations regionally. 
And intra-country migration may be hindered or constrained by cost and 
administrative regulations. 
 
One way to explore the question is to estimate poverty in the future by different 
scenarios in order to assess if poverty in MICs will be easily addressed by growth in 
those countries which are currently LMICs. This can be done by drawing upon an 
approach taken by Moss and Leo (2011) and Santos and Sumner (2012, 
forthcoming) and Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) which involves generating three 
different growth scenarios as follows:  
 
An optimistic scenario assumes that for 2009–2020 and 2009–2030 average 
incomes will rise at the average annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product 
PPP pc data in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) (2012) for the period 
2009–2016 (2011-2016 data are projections).  
 
A moderate growth scenario assumes that from 2009 average incomes will grow at 
an average annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (PPP) per capita for 
the period 2009–2016, minus 1 per cent on the basis that this is the average error 
historically observed in IMF growth estimates/projections (as per empirical analysis 
of Aldenhoff 2007).  
 
A pessimistic growth scenario assumes that from 2009 average incomes will grow at 
half of the average annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (PPP) per 
capita for the period 2009–2016. 
 
These growth scenarios then generate, for each country, GDP PPP and GNI per 
capita forecasts for 2020 and 2030. The former, GDP pc PPP can be used to 
estimate poverty in 2020 and 2030 though the assumption of static inequality must 
be made, and the latter, GNI pc can be used to estimate country classifications in 
2020 and 2030.  
 
By taking the poverty and distribution survey data from PovcalNet (World Bank, 
2012), and the 2020 and 2030 population estimates from the UN (medium variant), 
we can estimate the number of poor people in 2020 and 2030 in each country as well 
as the poverty gap as a proportion of GDP (PPP$ constant 2005 international $).  
 
Two essential caveats must be noted: First, such projections are an inherently 
imprecise exercise that merely illustrates possible future scenarios (See also 
discussion in Kanbur and Sumner, 2011; Karver et al. 2012, forthcoming and Kenny 
and Williams, 2001). Second, the approach likely over-states poverty reduction in 
fast growing economies such as lower MICs because it assumes static inequality in 
countries that are rapidly growing (which the discussion earlier suggest this is 
questionable and inequality can move both ways).  
 
Even so, the data suggests that the remaining $1.25 and $2 poverty in those 
countries that are currently MICs will remain half of all world poverty in 2020 and 
2030 (see table 3.6).  
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And given that some countries that are currently LICs will move into the LMIC 
category this suggests the structure of world poverty will remain split between LICs 
and MICs (see Table 3.6). Geographically, the data suggests poverty will be 
increasingly focused in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
As GDP rises the cost of ending poverty as a proportion of domestic GDP will (likely) 
fall, and poverty will become increasingly about national distribution, with the 
potential exception of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Table 3.6 Estimates of the global distribution of poverty in 2020 and 2030 
(moderate growth scenario; e = estimate) 
 
 Global distribution of $1.25 poverty (% world poverty) 
Global distribution of $2 
poverty (% world poverty) 
 2008/9 2020e 2030e 2008/9 2020e 2030e 
Low income (current group) 25.7 50.3 52.0 20.6 39.7 46.5 
Lower middle income (current group) 57.7 44.0 42.9 59.2 54.6 47.5 
Upper middle income (current group) 16.7 5.7 5.2 20.2 5.7 6.0 
[Estimated remaining LICs ] - 46.7 44.9 - 33.8 35.7 
       
East Asia and Pacific 21.5 3.8 0.8 26.1 7.9 4.0 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 7.9 0.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.9 6.8 7.3 2.9 5.3 6.3 
Middle East and North Africa 0.7 1.9 3.1 1.9 2.9 4.0 
South Asia 44.3 13.2 4.6 45.6 31.9 16.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 30.5 74.2 84.0 23.2 51.6 68.9 
Sources: Data estimates derived by using method of Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) and processed from PovcalNet 
(World Bank, 2012) and WEO (IMF, 2012), based on static inequality. Note: For method see text. 
 
The projections for 2020 and 2030 show that the number of LICs in 2020 could be in 
the range of 24 to 30, and in 2030 from 16 to 28 compared to the current 35 LICs 
(see Table 3.7 and Appendix 4).  
 
For ease of discussion here, and because of its consistency with the IMF’s historic 
overestimation of growth prospects, the moderate scenario is used here in the text 
(see Appendix 4 for data for all scenarios) and the discussion largely focuses on $2 
poverty, as by 2030 the international poverty line will presumably be adjusted closer 
to $2. Further, $2 is the median poverty line for all developing countries (Chen and 
Ravallion 2008; 2012). Data for $1.25 poverty is also presented for comparison. 
 
Table 3.7 Remaining LICs in 2020 and 2030 by three growth scenarios 
 
 2020 2030 
Scenario Pessimistic  Moderate  Optimistic  Pessimistic  Moderate  Optimistic  
Number of 
LICs 
30 27 24 28 20 16 
Source: Author’s estimates based on data from WDI (World Bank, 2011b) and WEO (IMF, 2012). Note: For method 
see text. See Appendix 4 for full list of countries by each scenario. 
 
Taking the moderate growth scenario, in 2020, poverty will be largely split as follows: 
60 per cent in countries that are currently MICs (in 2010), and 40 per cent in 
countries which are currently LICs in 2010. In 2030, global poverty will be split more 
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evenly between countries that are currently LICs and countries that are currently 
MICs (see Table 3.6 and Appendix 4).  
 
This suggests that even if inequality does not rise, poverty will remain an issue for 
MICs and of course as noted a number of the countries that are currently LICs will be 
MICs by then too.  
 
It also suggests the cost to end poverty will be minimal for those countries that are 
currently LMICs and UMICs as a percentage of GDP (see table 3.8).  
 
Although the cost in those countries that are currently LICs of ending $2 poverty 
would be 15 per cent of GDP in 2020, this falls to under 10 per cent of GDP in 2030.  
This suggests for a small number of countries (20 LICs in this moderate scenario) 
external support for poverty reduction will remain absolutely essential. However, in 
those countries that are currently LMICs the cost of ending $2 poverty will be just 1.2 
per cent of GDP in 2020 and 0.6 per cent in 2030 and negligible in those countries 
that are currently UMICs. 
 
Table 3.8 Estimates of the global poverty gap as % GDP, PPP$ constant 2005 
international $) by $1.25 and $2 poverty line in 2008/9, 2020 and 2030 (moderate 
growth scenario; e = estimate) 
 
 
$1.25 poverty gap as % GDP $2 poverty gap as  
% GDP 
 2008/9 2020e 2030e 2008/9 2020e 2030e 
Low income (current group) 8.4 4.6 3.0 25.4 14.9 9.7 
Lower middle income (current group) 1.3 0.3 0.2 5.5 1.2 0.6 
Upper middle income (current group) 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 
[Estimated remaining LICs] - 7.0 7.3 - 21.1 22.2 
       
East Asia and Pacific 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.0 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Middle East and North Africa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 
South Asia 1.5 0.1 0.0 7.5 0.8 0.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 3.5 2.6 13.0 10.3 8.0 
Sources: Data estimates derived by using method of Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) and processed from PovcalNet 
(2012) and WEO (IMF, 2012), based on static inequality. Note: For method see text. 
 
The moderate scenario projections suggest global poverty in 2020 and 2030 
concentrated in a mix of countries. In 2020, the ten countries with the highest 
contributions to global poverty are projected to be: 
 
‐ Those countries that are currently LICs and will remain in LICs in 2020: DRC, 
Tanzania, Madagascar, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda 
‐ Countries that are currently LMICs and would be LMICs in 2020 too: Nigeria, 
Pakistan and India  
‐ One country that is currently LIC but projected to be LMIC in 2020: 
Bangladesh  
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And in 2030: 
 
‐ Those countries that are currently LICs and will remain in LICs in 2030: DRC, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda and Mali. 
‐ Countries that are currently LMICs and would be LMICs in 2030 too: Nigeria 
and Pakistan  
‐ Two countries that are currently LICs but projected to be LMICs in 2030: 
Tanzania and Kenya and one country that is currently a LMIC but projected to 
be a LIC in 2030: Yemen 
 
However, one should remember the caveats noted above - that this endeavour of 
making projections for income/expenditure poverty is an inherently imprecise 
exercise that merely illustrates possible future scenarios.  
 
In terms of other dimensions of poverty such as education, nutrition and health in 
particular, historical trends can be used to produce approximations for 2030 with a 
greater level of reliability (see Karver, Kenny and Sumner, 2012, forthcoming). 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
In 1990, approximately 90 per cent of the world’s poor people (by both $1.25 and $2 
international poverty lines) lived in low-income countries, where the average PPP per 
capita income was barely above the higher international poverty line – and thus 
addressing ‘global poverty’ was framed largely around international redistribution via 
aid. In 2008, 70–80 per cent of the world’s poor people (respectively, by the $1.25 
and $2 international poverty lines) lived in middle-income countries. In the LMIC 
group, the average PPP per capita income for the group was approximately five 
times the higher international poverty line. This raises the question of whether ‘global 
poverty’ requires reframing as a national distribution issue in a world of fewer and 
fewer aid dependent countries, either now or at some point in the foreseeable future. 
 
Absolute income thresholds for country classification mean income growth will 
always imply a transition of the poor from LICs to MICs unless poverty falls 
drastically in absolute numbers during the transition. Does it then follow that poverty 
becomes a domestic issue related to national inequality? It depends on the country 
and the growth experience. It is likely that different countries are experiencing 
different trajectories – based on the evolution of population growth, income growth, 
inequality and the poverty gap. One might suggest that there are two stylised groups 
of country evident if one considers a matrix of 2 x 2 with ‘equitable growth’ (here 
defined as the incomes of the poor rising in line with average income) and the 
‘poverty gap’ as the key variables.  
 
Group 1 countries are those with healthy and relatively equitable growth, and a low 
poverty gap as a percentage of GDP. In this group, the costs of poverty reduction are 
within domestic financial capacity.  
 
Group 2 countries are those with more unequal growth and larger poverty gaps; 
which may attain MIC status in terms of mean income but do not yet have the 
domestic financial fiscal means to address poverty despite higher average incomes. 
For Group 1, the issue is one of domestic redistribution.  
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Group 1 may be largely concentrated in parts of Latin America and East Asia. Group 
2 may be largely concentrated in India and sub-Saharan Africa. Looking ahead to 
2020 and 2030, as average incomes rise, more and more of the world’s poor will live 
in Group 1 countries, and poverty will increasingly become a matter of national 
inequality.  
 
This might imply that a fundamental reframing of global poverty is approaching; 
‘traditional aid’ (meaning resource transfer) is of limited relevance, and the core 
variable to explain global poverty is increasingly national distribution and thus 
national political economy.  
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Appendix 1: Data coverage 
 
Table A1 Population coverage of US$1.25 and US$2 poverty data by country 
classifications, 2008 (% population covered, current country classifications) 
 
 2008 
LIC 83.5 
MICs 98.0 
LICs and MICs 96.0 
Fragile states (45 countries of OECD, 2011b) 97.2 
Least Developed Countries 85.3 
Source: Processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012). Note: Consumption surveys used for all countries with the 
following exceptions for countries with income surveys: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Moldova, Rep., Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. OECD (2011b) fragile states = 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Côte d'Ivoire, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Kiribati Korea, Dem Rep., 
Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestinian Adm. Areas, Papua New 
Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-
Leste, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Rep. and Zimbabwe. 
 
Table A2 Countries with no poverty data 
 
Country Country Classification Population (2008) 
Afghanistan Low income 29,021,099 
Eritrea Low income 4,926,877 
Korea, Dem. Rep. Low income 23,818,753 
Myanmar Low income 49,563,019 
Somalia Low income 8,926,326 
Zimbabwe Low income 12,462,879 
Kiribati Lower middle income 96,558 
Kosovo Lower middle income 1,795,000 
Marshall Islands Lower middle income 59,667 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Lower middle income 110,414 
Mongolia Lower middle income 2,641,216 
Samoa Lower middle income 178,869 
Solomon Islands Lower middle income 510,672 
Tonga Lower middle income 103,566 
Tuvalu Lower middle income n/a 
Uzbekistan Lower middle income 27,313,700 
Vanuatu Lower middle income 233,866 
American Samoa Upper middle income 66,107 
Antigua and Barbuda Upper middle income 86,634 
Argentina Upper middle income 39,882,980 
Cuba Upper middle income 11,204,735 
Dominica Upper middle income 73,193 
Grenada Upper middle income 103,538 
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Lebanon Upper middle income 4,193,758 
Libya Upper middle income 6,294,181 
Mauritius Upper middle income 1,268,854 
Mayotte Upper middle income 191,187 
Palau Upper middle income 20,279 
St. Kitts and Nevis Upper middle income 49,190 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Upper middle income 109,117 
Source: Processed from PovcalNet (World Bank 2012).  
 
Table A3 Population coverage of country indicators, 2009, (% population of 
group covered) 
 
 LICs MICs FCAS LDCs Q1 
GDP 
PPP pc 
GNI per capita (Atlas, current US$) 88.4 100.0 92.3 88.7 91.2 
GNI per capita (PPP, current int’l $) 93.0 99.6 95.8 93.8 95.2 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 88.0 99.7 95.8 93.8 95.2 
           
Total reserves in months of imports 63.2 96.0 65.0 48.5 59.8 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) 86.8 96.0 92.8 89.5 91.8 
Net ODA received (% of gross capital formation) 76.8 94.8 63.2 45.9 57.8 
GDP in agriculture (%) 69.2 83.0 67.8 52.6 63.1 
Urbanisation (% population) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Gross domestic savings as % GDP 95.9 99.3 67.2 51.8 62.4 
Agricultural raw materials exports as % merch. Exports 78.2 98.6 54.4 32.9 47.7 
Ores and metal exports as % merchandise exports 78.2 98.6 54.4 33.0 47.8 
Sources: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b) and PovCal (World Bank, 2012). Note: FCAS = 45 Fragile 
and Conflict Affected States of OECD (2011b); LDC = Least Developed Countries Group; Q1 GDP pc PPP = poorest 
quartile of countries by GDP per capita PPP.
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Appendix 2: Correlations of GDP pc 
PPP and structural indicators 
 
Table A4 GDP pc PPP and Net ODA/Gross capital formation in LICs and LMICs 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day NetODArecAsPercGCF 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,378**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,002
N 84 65
NetODArecAsPercGCF 
Pearson Correlation -,378** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,002  
N 65 67
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 Quadratic = 0.240 R2 Linear = 0.143 
Source: WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Averages for 2008-2010 used. 
 
Table A5 GDP pc PPP and Net ODA/GNI in LICs and LMICs 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day NetODArecPercGNI 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,362**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,001
N 84 83
NetODArecPercGNI 
Pearson Correlation -,362** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,001  
N 83 87
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 Quadratic = 0.168 R2 Linear = 0.131 
Source: WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Averages for 2008-2010 used. 
 
Table A6 GDP pc PPP and Agriculture Exports/Exports in LICs and LMICs 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day AgriExpAsPercTotalExp 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,352**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,006
N 84 59
AgriExpAsPercTotalExp 
Pearson Correlation -,352** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,006  
N 59 60
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 Quadratic = 0.164 R2 Linear = 0.124 
Source: WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Averages for 2008-2010 used. 
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Table A7 GDP pc PPP and Agriculture value added/GDP in LICs and LMICs 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day AgriVAddAsPercGDP 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,647**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000
N 84 69
AgriVAddAsPercGDP 
Pearson Correlation -,647** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 69 71
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 Quadratic = 0.478 R2 Linear = 0.419 
Source: WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Averages for 2008-2010 used. 
 
Table A8 GDP pc PPP and Urbanisation in LICs and LMICs 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day UrbanOfTotalPop 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,443**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000
N 84 84
UrbanOfTotalPop 
Pearson Correlation ,443** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 84 90
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 Quadratic = 0.201 R2 Linear = 0.196 
Source: WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Averages for 2008-2010 used. 
 
Table A9 GDP pc PPP and Gross Domestic Savings/GDP in LICs and LMICs 
 
 GDPpcPPP2005intl$day GDSaveAsPercGDP 
GDPpcPPP2005intl$day 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,337**
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,006
N 84 66
GDSaveAsPercGDP 
Pearson Correlation ,337** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,006  
N 66 68
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). R2 Linear = 0.114 R2 Quadratic = 0.143 
Source: Processed from WDI (World Bank, 2011b). Note: Averages for 2008-2010 used. 
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Appendix 3: Inequality data 
 
Table A10 Estimates of share of GNI by deciles, 1990 and 2008 (nearest data, 
population weighted) 
 
 GNI  
Average share (%) 
 1990 2008 
D10   
All developing countries 27.6 31.0 
LMICs (current group) 24.8 29.3 
LMICs (current group) minus India 28.2 30.4 
UMICs (current group) 28.2 33.7 
UMICs (current group) minus China 35.0 36.3 
New MICs 30.6 31.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 36.3 35.8 
East Asia and Pacific 26.2 31.4 
South Asia 26.6 27.9 
Latin America and Carib. 37.2 39.5 
D7–D9     
All developing countries 36.2 36.0 
LMICs (current group) 36.2 35.5 
LMICs (current group) minus India 37.0 36.0 
UMICs (current group) 37.6 37.4 
UMICs (current group) minus China 36.6 36.2 
New MICs 35.8 35.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 37.1 35.5 
East Asia and Pacific 37.6 37.6 
South Asia 35.5 35.2 
Latin America and Carib. 36.8 34.9 
D5–D6     
All developing countries 15.6 14.9 
LMICs (current group) 16.0 15.5 
LMICs (current group) minus India 15.8 15.2 
UMICs (current group) 15.7 14.4 
UMICs (current group) minus China 13.9 13.6 
New MICs 15.1 15.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.4 13.7 
East Asia and Pacific 16.2 15.0 
South Asia 16.4 15.9 
Latin America and Carib. 13.5 12.4 
D1–D4     
All developing countries 19.1 17.1 
LMICs (current group) 20.3 19.6 
LMICs (current group) minus India 19.0 18.4 
UMICs (current group) 18.5 14.5 
UMICs (current group) minus China 14.5 13.9 
New MICs 18.5 18.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.3 15.0 
East Asia and Pacific 20.0 15.9 
South Asia 21.5 21.0 
Latin America and Carib. 12.4 11.1 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012).  
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Table A11 Estimates of population (millions and % population) by region and 
expenditure groups, 1990 and 2008 
 
 Less than $2 $2–$4 $4–$10 $10–$20 $20+ 
 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 
Millions of people by expenditure category 
Sub-Saharan Africa 369.4 547.5 76.2 163.5 31.4 62.7 6.0 11.8 2.7 6.1 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
1,242.
8 614.3 226.7 605.0 55.6 506.9 8.0 100.6 2.4 25.5 
South Asia 928.6 1,074.7 151.2 352.2 27.2 78.4 2.6 8.7 0.3 2.0 
Latin 
America/Caribbean 80.1 67.4 69.7 102.2 81.4 198.6 29.2 95.2 16.6 51.3 
China 960.6 394.3 152.2 426.8 21.2 410.0 0.9 76.4 0.2 17.1 
India 701.7 825.1 123.3 252.8 22.0 54.5 2.2 6.0 0.3 1.5 
LMICs (current 
group) 
1,256.
7 
1,394.
5 314.2 641.0 114.3 260.3 23.2 51.4 5.2 11.8 
UMICs (current 
group) 
1,089.
8 476.6 345.5 621.0 298.2 838.3 97.8 294.3 36.4 122.6 
New MICs 1,132.
7 
1,266.
4 220.2 487.7 68.8 158.8 16.9 33.0 3.5 6.2 
All developing 
countries 
2,696.
3 
2,357.
4 690.7 
1,391.
4 436.8 
1,132.
0 143.9 349.4 49.2 135.0 
All developing 
countries minus 
China  
1,735.
8 
1,963.
0 538.5 964.6 415.6 722.0 143.0 272.9 49.0 117.9 
% of population by expenditure category 
Sub-Saharan Africa 76.1 69.2 15.7 20.7 6.5 7.9 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.8 
East Asia and 
Pacific 80.9 33.2 14.8 32.7 3.6 27.4 0.5 5.4 0.2 1.4 
South Asia 83.7 70.9 13.6 23.2 2.5 5.2 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 
Latin 
America/Caribbean 28.9 13.1 25.2 19.9 29.4 38.6 10.6 18.5 6.0 10.0 
China 84.6 29.8 13.4 32.2 1.9 31.0 0.1 5.8 0.0 1.3 
India 82.6 72.4 14.5 22.2 2.6 4.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 
LMICs (current 
group) 73.3 59.1 18.3 27.2 6.7 11.0 1.4 2.2 0.3 0.5 
UMICs (current 
group) 58.4 20.3 18.5 26.4 16.0 35.6 5.2 12.5 1.9 5.2 
New MICs 78.5 64.9 15.3 25.0 4.8 8.1 1.2 1.7 0.2 0.3 
All developing 
countries 67.1 43.9 17.2 25.9 10.9 21.1 3.6 6.5 1.2 2.5 
All developing 
countries minus 
China 
60.2 48.6 18.7 23.9 14.4 17.9 5.0 6.8 1.7 2.9 
Source: Data processed from PovcalNet (World Bank, 2012).  
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Appendix 4: Projections for 2020 and 
2030 
 
Table A12 Remaining LICs in 2020 and 2030 by three growth scenarios 
 
2020 2030 
Pessimistic 
scenario 
Moderate 
scenario 
Optimistic 
scenario 
Pessimistic 
scenario 
Moderate 
scenario 
Optimistic 
scenario 
Bangladesh Benin Benin Benin Benin Burundi 
Benin Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Central African Republic 
Burkina Faso Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Comoros 
Burundi Central African Republic 
Central African 
Republic 
Central African 
Republic 
Central African 
Republic 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Cambodia Chad Chad Chad Chad Ethiopia 
Central African 
Republic Comoros Comoros Comoros Comoros Gambia, The 
Chad Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Guinea-Bissau 
Comoros Ethiopia Ethiopia Côte d'Ivoire Ethiopia Guinea 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Gambia, The Gambia, The Ethiopia Gambia, The Liberia 
Ethiopia Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Gambia, The Guinea-Bissau Madagascar 
Gambia, The Guinea Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guinea Malawi 
Guinea-Bissau Haiti Haiti Guinea Liberia Mali 
Guinea Kenya Liberia Haiti Madagascar Nepal 
Haiti Liberia Madagascar Kenya Malawi Niger 
Kenya Madagascar Malawi Liberia Mali Togo 
Kyrgyz Republic Malawi Mali Madagascar Nepal Uganda 
Liberia Mali Mozambique Malawi Niger  
Madagascar Mozambique Nepal Mali Togo  
Malawi Nepal Niger Mozambique Uganda  
Mali Niger Rwanda Nepal Yemen, Rep.  
Mozambique Rwanda Sierra Leone Niger   
Nepal Sierra Leone Tanzania Rwanda   
Niger Tajikistan Togo Sierra Leone   
Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Tajikistan   
Sierra Leone Togo  Tanzania   
Tajikistan Uganda  Togo   
Tanzania Yemen, Rep.  Uganda   
Togo   Yemen, Rep.   
Uganda      
Yemen, Rep.      
Source: Data processed from WDI (World Bank, 2012) and WEO (IMF, 2012). Note: See text for method. 
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Table A13 Estimates of the total poverty gap at $1.25 as a % GDP in 2020 and 
2030 (based on total poverty gap and GDP in 2020 and 2030 using 2005 
constant PPP$) 
 
 2020 2030 
 Scenario Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic 
Low income (2011 
group) 8.0 4.6 3.5 8.2 3.0 1.7 
Lower middle 
income (2011 
group) 
0.6 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Upper middle 
income (2011 
group) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
[Remaining LICs 
in 2020/2030] 7.7 7.0 6.3 12.9 7.3 5.1 
Sources: Data estimates derived be using method of Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) and processed from PovcalNet 
(World Bank, 2012) and WEO (IMF, 2012) based on static inequality. 
 
Table A14 Estimates of the total poverty gap at $2 as a % GDP in 2020 and 2030 
(based on total poverty gap and GDP in 2020 and 2030 using 2005 constant 
PPP$) 
 
 2020 2030 
 Scenario Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic 
Low income (2011 
group) 24.5 14.9 11.6 24.7 9.7 5.8 
Lower middle 
income (2011 
group) 
2.7 1.2 0.9 1.9 0.6 0.3 
Upper middle 
income (2011 
group) 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
[Remaining LICs 
in 2020/2030] 23.7 21.1 19.3 36.8 22.2 15.7 
Sources: Data estimates derived be using method of Karver et al. (2012, forthcoming) and processed from PovcalNet 
(World Bank, 2012) and WEO (IMF, 2012) based on static inequality. 
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